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Quantum cryptographic conferencing (QCC) holds promise for distributing information-theoretic secure keys
among multiple users over long distance. Limited by the fragility of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state,
QCC networks based on directly distributing GHZ states at long distance still face big challenge. Another two
potential approaches are measurement device independent QCC and conference key agreement with single-
photon interference, which was proposed based on the post-selection of GHZ states and the post-selection of
W state, respectively. However, implementations of the former protocol are still heavily constrained by the
transmission rate η of optical channels and the complexity of the setups for post-selecting GHZ states. Mean-
while, the latter protocol cannot be cast to a measurement device independent prepare-and-measure scheme.
Combining the idea of post-selecting GHZ state and recently proposed twin-field quantum key distribution pro-
tocols, we report a QCC protocol based on weak coherent state interferences named phase-matching quantum
cryptographic conferencing, which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks. The proposed protocol can
improve the key generation rate from O(ηN) to O(ηN−1) compared with the measurement device independent
QCC protocols. Meanwhile, it can be easily scaled up to multiple parties due to its simple setup.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.HK, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum network [1–10], aimed at realizing quantum in-
formation tasks among multiple parties, is playing more and
more important roles in burgeoning quantum information pro-
cessing including quantum computing [11], quantum com-
munication [12] and quantum metrology [13]. Quantum
Cryptographic Conferencing (QCC) network [14–19], which
distributes information-theoretic secure keys among multiple
parties over long distance, is one of the most promising ap-
plications in quantum information science. With the rapid de-
velopment of quantum information processing, QCC network
is of great potential to improve the security of the communi-
cations in networks. For example, QCC network can be used
to broadcast message to users securely. So far, several pro-
tocols are proposed to realize QCC networks. The first pro-
tocol is based on the predistribution of multi-party entangle-
ment states [14–16]. These presentations require the predistri-
bution of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entanglement
state [20], which is initially introduced to verify Bell’s theo-
rem [21, 22]. Though great endeavours have been made to
improve preparation of multipartite GHZ states [23–29], the
low intensity and fragility of the GHZ states make its apply-
ing to practical QCC network facing big challenge within cur-
rent technology. The second protocol is measurement device
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independent QCC (MDI-QCC) which is based on the post-
selection of GHZ state [17]. Once a successful detection event
occurs, a GHZ state is shared among multiple parties [30].
Thus, multiple parties can distribute secret key bits among
them by the post-selected entanglement states. Further, the
measurement device can be controlled by an untrusted third
party, Eve. Therefore, according to the measurement device
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) idea [31]
(see also [32]), it is immune to all detector side-channel at-
tacks. Combined with decoy-state method [33], MDI-QCC
network is promised more reasonably to be realized in ex-
periments within current technology. The third protocol is
the conference key agreement with single photon interference
(single-photon CKA) [18], which is based on post-selection
of the W state [34]. However, the single-photon CKA pro-
tocol cannot be cast to a MDI prepare-and-measure scheme.
Meanwhile, the signal pulses cannot be substituted by coher-
ent states, and the local qubits have to resort to quantum mem-
ories. Thus, the feasibility of single-photon CKA requires fur-
ther investigation [18].
Recently, twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-
QKD) and phase-matching quantum key distribution (PM-
QKD) [35–44] are reported to overcome the repeater-less rate-
distance limit [45] of quantum key distribution (QKD). By in-
troducing single-photon interference, these protocols achieve
key generation rates scaling with the square-root of the chan-
nel transmittance O(
√
η) which exceeds the rate-distance
limit without quantum repeaters. Here η is the transmission
rate of the optical channel between two users. At the same
time, their measurement device can be controlled by an un-
trusted third party, which is also immune to all detector side-
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FIG. 1. Schematic setup for N-party PM-QCC network. φ1, φ2 and
φN ∈ [0,2pi) label the random phases for parties P1, P2 and PN , re-
spectively. The k1, k2 and kN ∈ {0,1} label the random bits for par-
ties P1, P2 and PN , respectively. DL1(DR1): the left (right) detector
of the first measurement branch. DL2(DR2): the left (right) detector
of the second measurement branch. DLN−1(DRN−1): the left (right)
detector of the (N− 1)-th measurement branch. BS: Beam Splitter.
FC: Fiber Channel.
channel attacks [31]. These new types of QKD protocols have
also been realized [46–50] and shown to extend the distance
of repeaterless fibre QKD to over 500 km [50].
In this paper, we present a new QCC network protocol
by combining ideas of phase-matching weak coherent pulses
(WCPs) interference and post-selecting GHZ states, named
as phase-matching quantum cryptographic conferencing (PM-
QCC). As shown in Appendix A and B, successful WCPs
interference events imply successful post-selection of multi-
party GHZ states within the GHZ state basis:
|ψ j,i1i2···iN−1〉=
1√
2
[|0i1i2 · · · iN−1〉
+(−1) j|1i¯1 i¯2 · · · i¯N−1〉],
(1)
where j (im) ∈ {0,1} is called phase (amplitude) bit, 1≤m≤
N − 1, i¯m is logical negation of im. Resorting to the entan-
glement distillation protocol [51], one can distill the perfect
N-qubit GHZ state:
|Φ+〉= 1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)N , (2)
which can be used to generate secret key bits among N parties.
In terms of the presented PM-QCC network, since the mea-
surement device can be untrusted, it is immune to all detec-
tor side-channel attacks. Owing to its simpler setup struc-
ture compared with MDI-QCC networks based on GHZ an-
alyzer [30, 52], one can extend PM-QCC to more users eas-
ily. Similar to the TF-QKD protocol, the key generation rate
of the presented PM-QCC network can be improved to scale
with ηN−1, whereas that of MDI-QCC network scales with
ηN . Here, η is the transmission rate of the optical channel
from each party to the untrusted third party, Eve. Practically,
there might be small-scale interference between N′ parties (N′
parties are near-neighbor connected, and 2≤ N′ ≤ N) instead
of perfect interference of N parties. It is demonstrated that the
small-scale N′-party PM-QCC can still be realized securely
with key generation rates scaling with ηN′−1.
II. PM-QCC NETWORK
Supposing that N parties P1, P2, · · · , PN plan to conduct a
quantum cryptographic conference task, see Fig. 1. They can
encode their random bits in their phase randomized coherent
pulses. The encoded coherent pulses are sent to the untrusted
third party, Eve, who is supposed to perform interference mea-
surements. The N-party PM-QCC network works as follows:
Step.1 Preparation: Party P1 randomly generates one bit k1 ∈
{0,1} and one coherent pulse with a random phase
φ1 ∈ [0,2pi). Then, he encodes the random bit to
the coherent pulse and get a phase randomized co-
herent pulses |ei(φ1+pik1)√µ1〉. Similarly, parties P2,
· · · , PN prepare their phase randomized coherent pulses
|ei(φ2+pik2)√µ2〉, · · · , |ei(φN+pikN)√µN〉, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 1, the settings for P1, PN are different
from that for P2, · · · , PN−1 in the experimental setup.
Thus, the intensities of the weak coherent pulses used
by parties P1, PN are set to be µ1,µN ∈ { µ2 > ν2 > ω2 >τ
2 > · · · > 0}, while the intensities for parties P2, · · · ,
PN−1 are set to be µt ∈ {µ > ν > ω > τ > · · · > 0}
(2 ≤ t ≤ N − 1). The pulses with intensity µ are
used as signal pulses and the pulses with intensities
{ν ,ω,τ, · · · ,0} are used as decoy pulses.
Step.2 Measurement: All the parties send their pulses directly
to the untrusted third party Eve. By design, an honest
Eve splits each pulse of parties P2, · · · , PN−1 into two
separated coherent pulses using 50 : 50 beam splitters
(BS1) to perform interference measurements as shown
in Fig. 1. Eve measures the received pulses and records
measurement results. Here, successful detection events
are defined as coincidence clicks of N−1 measurement
branches, within which only one detector clicks.
Step.3 Announcement: Eve announces measurement results
for successful detection events. Then, all the parties an-
nounce their random phases φ1, φ2 · · · φN and their ran-
domly chosen intensities µ1,µ2, · · · ,µN , respectively.
Step.4 Sifting: When a successful detection event is an-
nounced by Eve, the N parties P1, P2, · · · , PN keep
their random bits k1, k2 · · · kN , respectively. A suc-
cessful detection event is one of 2N−1 coincident click
events in the set {DL1DL2 · · ·DLN−1 , DR1DL2 · · ·DLN−1 ,· · · , DR1DR2 · · ·DRN−1}. Here, DLl(Rl) means that only
the detector DLl (DRl ) clicks in the l-th measurement
branch. According to Eve’s announcements, they co-
operate to flip theirs bits to make their encoded phases
the same with that of events DL1DL2 · · ·DLN−1 . Then, P1,
P2,· · · , PN keep their random bits only when the phase-
matching conditions are satisfied: |φ1− φ2| = 0 or pi ,
3|φ2−φ3| = 0 or pi , · · · , |φN−1−φN | = 0 or pi and their
intensities are 2µ1 = µt = 2µN (2 ≤ t ≤ N− 1). Then,
according to their phase announcements, they cooper-
ate to flip theirs kept random bits to be the same with
that of |φ1−φ2|= 0, |φ2−φ3|= 0, · · · , |φN−1−φN |= 0
if they are not the case.
Step.5 Parameter estimation and key distillation: The above
steps are repeated enough times to distill the raw key
bits. From the data set generated by the signal pulses,
the users can directly estimate the gain Qµ and marginal
quantum bit error rates (QBER) EZµ,P1P2 , E
Z
µ,P1P3 , · · · ,
EZµ,P1PN from the measurement results. From the data
set generated by the decoy pulses, the users can esti-
mate the phase error EXµ according to decoy-state meth-
ods (see Appendix D for details). Finally, they distill
private key bits by performing error correction and pri-
vacy amplification on the raw key.
For the coherent pulse interference measurement on the l-th
(1 ≤ l ≤ N − 1) measurement branch, there would be only
one detector click if the encoded phases of two pulses with
equal intensities are matched, i.e. DLl (or DRl ) would click if
∆φl = |φl +pikl − (φl+1 +pikl+1)| = 0 (or pi). This is vital in
the security of PM-QCC network.
In the above N-party PM-QCC network, the random phases
φ1, φ2,· · · , φN that P1, P2,· · · , PN attach to their pulses are con-
tinuous. Thus, the precise phase-matching condition |φm −
φm+1| = 0 or pi is hard to realize. Moreover, we suppose that
the lasers of P1, P2,· · · , PN are perfectly locked which is also
impractical in experiments. To overcome these problems, we
introduce the phase-compensation method [35, 36] that can
help to conduct phase matching and phase reference. For
an arbitrary party Pm, the phase interval [0,2pi) is cut into M
slices {∆ jm} with 0≤ jm ≤M−1, ∆ jm = [ 2piM jm, 2piM ( jm+1)).
In the Announcement step, what N parties P1, P2, · · · , PN an-
nounce are their phase slice indexes j1, j2, · · · , jN instead of
their exact phases φ1, φ2, · · · , φN , respectively. Then, in the
Sifting step, party Pm and Pm+1 only need to compare their
slices indexes, | jm+ jam− jm+1| mod M = 0 or M/2, where
jam ∈{0,1, · · · ,M−1} is an adjusted slice index to compensate
the deviation of phase reference for parties Pm and Pm+1. In
practice, jam can be determined in the Parameter estimation
step by minimizing the QBER. Although there will be intrin-
sic misalignment errors in the sifting induced by the coarse
split of the phase interval, this makes phase-sifting practical
without affecting the security [36].
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Without loss of generality, we consider an entanglement-
based protocol that party Pm prepares entanglement states be-
tween his virtual qubits and his WCPs instead of directly
preparing WCPs (see Appendix B for detail). Thus, its se-
curity analysis applies to the entanglement distillation argu-
ment [16, 53, 54]. Following the entanglement distillation
argument [53, 54], to generate a sequence of almost perfect
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FIG. 2. (a) The PM-QCC protocol with phase matching condition
φ1 = φ2 = · · ·φN = φ satisfied. (b) Equivalent PM-QCC protocol af-
ter Eve’s splitting with phase matching condition φ1 = φ2 = · · ·φN =
φ satisfied. Eve splits each pulse of parties P2, · · · , PN−1 into two
separated coherent pulses using a beam splitter BS1 to perform inter-
ference measurements. Once a success detection event is achieved,
the encoded phases of N parties are correlated with each other.
p1, p2L, · · · , pN : path modes after Eve’s splitting. DL1(DR1): the left
(right) detector of the first measurement branch. DL2(DR2): the left
(right) detector of the second measurement branch. DLN−1(DRN−1):
the left (right) detector of the (N− 1)-th measurement branch. BS:
Beam Splitter.
secure key bits, parties P1, P2, · · · , PN only need to share a se-
quence of almost perfect GHZ states in term of monogamy of
entanglement [55, 56]. Therefore, what we are facing now is
to distill almost perfect GHZ states [51].
As described in Step.4, when phase matching condition is
satisfied, encoded random bits are kept. Without loss of gen-
erality, the phases are supposed to be φ1 = φ2 = · · · = φ . In
Fig. 2(a), the WCP with random phase φ of party P2 arriving
at the 50 : 50 beam splitter BS1 is split into two WCPs with
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FIG. 3. Key generation rate R of three-party PM-QCC, three-party
PM-QCC∗ (without phase post-selection in signal pulses) and MDI-
QCC network versus transmission distance L. The simulation re-
sult is obtained with parameters from Ref. [17] that the dark-count
rate pd = 1× 10−7, the loss rate of the channel α = 0.2dB/km,
the detection efficiency ηd = 93%, the error correction efficiency
f = 1.16, the misalignment error for MDI-QCC eMDId = 1.5% and
the phase misalignment error for PM-QCC* eδ = 1.5%. The number
of phase slices M for PM-QCC is optimized at different transmission
distances.
the same encoded phases.
|ei(φ+pik2)√µ〉 BS1−−→ |ei(φ+pik2)
√
µ/2〉|ei(φ+pik2)
√
µ/2〉, (3)
where φ +pik2 is the encoded phase of party P2. The WCPs
from party P2 is split into two branches to interfere with P1
and P3 respectively. Similarly, WCPs from parties P3, · · · ,
PN−1 are split. The third party, Eve, performs interfere mea-
surement for all N parties. Now, the protocol is equivalent to
that of Fig. 2(b).
Let us consider the entanglement based protocol of PM-
QCC (see Appendix B). Once there is a success detection
event, virtual qubits in N parties are entangled together. After
the distillation protocol (see Appendix A), perfect GHZ states
are shared between N parties. Finally, they can generate secret
key bits from the distillation of the GHZ state [15–17]. The
corresponding key generation rate is
RN−party =(
2
M
)N−1Qµ [1− f ·max{H(EZµ,P1P2),
H(EZµ,P1P3), · · · ,H(EZµ,P1PN )}−H(EXµ )],
(4)
where H(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary
entropy function. The EZµ,P1Pm (2 ≤ m ≤ N) is the marginal
QBER of parties P1 and Pm and can be estimated from Eve’s
measurement results directly. The EXµ is the phase error rate
which is an intrinsic error of the protocol and can be estimated
with the help of the decoy-state method in experiments (see
Appendix C and D). The Qµ is the overall gain, and 2M is
induced by phase post-selection in the phase compensation
method which can be optimized according to the experimental
parameters [35, 36].
As shown in Eq. 4, there is a prefactor ( 2M )
N−1 which is
induced by the phase post-selecting process in the key gen-
eration rate. It might cause descending in key generation
rate when the number of user increases. According to Ap-
pendix B, the PM-QCC protocol is still secure even when the
phase choices in the signal pulses are announced before Eve’s
measurement if one can estimate the phase error accurately.
Thus, the phase compensation method just provides a practical
and secure way to align the phases for signal pulses. Then, if
one can realize accurate and secure phase reference in his (or
her) lab, the PM-QCC protocol can be improved to a version
PM-QCC* without phase post-selection in signal pulses (see
Appendix E for detail). It has also been demonstrated in new
variants for TF-QKD and PM-QKD protocols [38, 39, 42–
44]. In the PM-QCC*, the factor ( 2M )
N−1 can be improved to
1, and the key generation rate is
R∗N−party =Q
∗
µ [1− f ·max{H(EZ∗µ,P1P2),
H(EZ∗µ,P1P3), · · · ,H(EZ∗µ,P1PN )}−H(EX∗µ )].
(5)
where Q∗µ is the overall gain, EZ∗µ,P1P2 , E
Z∗
µ,P1P2 , E
Z∗
µ,P1P2 are
marginal QBERs and EX∗µ is the phase error rate. Need to
note that the signal pulses from the parties can no longer be
regarded as photon number states since the phase random-
ization for signal pulses has been cancelled out in the PM-
QCC* protocol. Thus, the above mentioned decoy states dis-
cussion for the PM-QCC protocol becomes unsuitable for the
PM-QCC* protocol, and more delicate decoy-state method is
required to evaluate the phase error rate in the signals (see Ap-
pendix E) [40, 42, 43]. For example, as in [42], the estimation
of phase error rate is converted to the estimation of the yields
for the photon number state, which can be estimated using
phase randomized decoy states. Thus, the phase randomized
decoy states with different intensities can in principle be used
to constraint the phase error rate EXµ tightly and we leave it for
further studies.
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FIG. 4. Key generation rate R for 3-party PM-QCC, 3-party PM-
QCC with four decoy states (ν ,ω ,τ ,0) and 4-party PM-QCC ver-
sus transmission distance L. Parameters adopted in simulation are
derived from Ref. [57]: the dark-count rate pd = 7.2× 10−8, the
loss rate of the channel α = 0.2dB/km, the detection efficiency
ηd = 65%, the error correction efficiency f = 1.16.
5IV. PERFORMANCE OF PM-QCC NETWORK
Without loss of generality, the channels between party Pm
and measurement station are supposed to be symmetric. To
show the performance of PM-QCC network, we consider the
3-party PM-QCC network, 3-party PM-QCC* network and
compare our protocol with MDI-QCC network [17] using the
following experimental parameters: the intrinsic fiber channel
loss α = 0.2 dB/km, detection efficiency of threshold single-
photon detector ηd = 93%, dark-count rate pd = 10−7, error
correction efficiency f = 1.16, misalignment error for MDI-
QCC eMDId = 1.5% and phase error for PM-QCC* e
PM-QCC*
δ =
1.5%. As shown in Fig. 3, one can see that the key genera-
tion rates of PM-QCC can be well beyond that of MDI-QCC
around L= 80 km. The key rate is improved by approximately
2 orders of magnitude around L= 200 km. For the PM-QCC*
without phase-matching condition in signal pulses, the key
generation can be well beyond that MDI-QCC around L= 12
km. This improvement mainly comes from the fact that the
key generation rate of the presented PM-QCC network can
be improved to scale with ηN−1, whereas that of MDI-QCC
network scales with ηN (see Appendix F).
TABLE I. The performance for PM-QCC network at N = 3. The key
generation rate R, mean photon number µ and phase slice number
M are optimized with pd = 7.2× 10−8, ηd = 65%, f = 1.16 and
α = 0.2 dB/km at different transmission distance L.
R (bits per pulse) L (Km) µ M
2.6989×10−7 50 0.1333 13
1.6227×10−8 80 0.1299 13
2.5332×10−9 100 0.1291 13
2.2928×10−11 150 0.1263 13
2.6206×10−14 200 0.1239 17
To demonstrate the scalability and the decoy-state method
of PM-QCC network, we simulate the PM-QCC network
at N = 3 parties with infinite decoy states and four decoy
states (ν > ω > τ > 0). With experimental parameters given
in [57] that detection efficiency ηd = 65%, dark-count rate
pd = 7.2× 10−8, the performance of PM-QCC network at
N = 3 parties are presented in Fig. 4. The longest transmis-
sion distance between one user and the measurement station
of PM-QCC is beyond 200 km at N = 3 parties. Remarkably,
the longest transmission distance between two users is over
400 km by special arrangement. The optimized weak coher-
ent states µ and phase slice numbers M for given parameters at
N= 3 are presented in Table. I. Meanwhile, the key generation
rate for 3-party PM-QCC with four decoy states is optimized
over µ , ν , ω and τ for given parameters and M = 13. For ex-
ample, the key generation rate is R= 1.7327×10−11 (bits per
pulse) at L = 150 (km) with µ = 0.104815, ν = 0.0204583,
ω = 0.0182017, τ = 9.27216×10−5. Furthermore, we simu-
late the PM-QCC at N = 4 parties, and the simulation results
are present in Fig. 4.
According to the above discussion, it is feasible to realize
the PM-QCC network for three and even more parties with
current experimental technology. Meanwhile, the PM-QCC*
without phase post-selection in signal pulses (see Appendix E)
can be realized with further optimization and accurate phase
reference in a long distance.
Practically, there might be interferences of only N′ parties
(N′ parties are near-neighbor connected, and 2 ≤ N′ ≤ N) in-
stead of perfect interference of N parties. In this case, ac-
cording to Step.1 of the PM-QCC network, the weak coherent
pulses prepared by parties at broken points are |√µ〉 instead
of |√µ/2〉 (the encoded phase is omit here). While, as shown
in Fig. 1, the intensities of weak coherent pulses arriving at
the third party are equal in an inference branch. Therefore,
higher amounts of weak coherent pulses are lost during the
transmission for broken points compared with that for unbro-
ken points. It is demonstrated that the secure reduced small-
scale PM-QCC networks can also be constructed among N′
parties with key generation rate RreducedPM−QCC ∝ ηN
′−1 (see
Appendix G for detail).
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Based on the multiparty weak coherent pulses interference,
we present a new protocol named as phase matching quan-
tum cryptographic conferencing (PM-QCC) network that can
distribute information-theoretic secure keys among N parties.
In the merit of simpler setup, the PM-QCC network can be
conveniently generalized to N parties and can go beyond the
existing QCC networks. Firstly, similarly to the MDI-QCC
network, the PM-QCC network is immune to all detector
side-channel attacks since the measurement device can be un-
trusted. Secondly, compared with the MDI-QCC networks
based on the GHZ analyzer, the PM-QCC can be more eas-
ily extended to multiple users due to simpler setup structure.
Thirdly, the key generation rate of the presented PM-QCC
network can be improved to scale with ηN−1, whereas that
of MDI-QCC network scales with ηN . Fourthly, consider-
ing practical cases that small-scale interferences between N′
parties instead of perfect interferences of N parties, the small-
scale N′-party PM-QCC can still be realized. Finally, based
on the setup of the PM-QCC network, GHZ state distribution
networks can be constructed directly, which may be of great
potential for other implementations in quantum information
science.
During the preparation of this manuscript, a related work
based on the post-selection of W state [34] has been reported
in Ref. [18] which is named as conference key agreement with
single-photon interference (single-photon CKA). Compared
with the single-photon CKA, the proposed protocol is an es-
sentially different protocol. Specifically, the proposed proto-
col is a MDI prepare-and-measure scheme, while, the single-
photon CKA cannot be cast to a MDI prepare-and-measure
scheme in which all the parties have to measure their local
qubits and trust the measurement results. Meanwhile, the sig-
nal qubits sent to the measurement station cannot be replaced
by coherent states, and the local qubits have to resort to quan-
tum memories in the single-photon CKA. Thus, the feasibility
of the single-photon CKA requires further investigation [18].
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Appendix A: Distillation of GHZ State
Inspired by the quantum key distribution protocol based on
entanglement distillation [53, 54], multi-party quantum con-
ference key distribution protocols based on entanglement dis-
tillation are proposed to securely distribute random bits be-
tween multiple users [15–17]. The security of phase matching
quantum cryptographic conferencing network (PM-QCC) is
based on the distillation of N-qubit GHZ state [51]
|Φ+〉= 1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)N , (A1)
which is stabilized by a group of stabilizer generators,
S0 = XXXX · · ·X ,
S1 = ZZII · · · I,
S2 = ZIZI · · · I,
S3 = ZIIZ · · · I,
...
SN−1 = ZIII · · ·Z,
(A2)
where X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
are Pauli
matrices. The corresponding N-qubit GHZ state basis is
|ψ j,i1i2···iN−1〉=
1√
2
[|0i1i2 · · · iN−1〉
+(−1) j|1i¯1 i¯2 · · · i¯N−1〉],
(A3)
where j, im ∈ {0,1}, 1 ≤ m ≤ N−1, i¯m is logical negation of
im. If j = 1 (im = 1), the basis vector is the −1 eigenvalue of
S0 (Sm). It means that there is a phase error (bit error) to the
original GHZ state. Thus, j (or im) is also called phase (or
amplitude) bit. Using the multipartite hashing method [51],
the yield of distillation of the pure N-qubit GHZ state is
D=1−max{H(EZµ,P1P2),H(EZµ,P1P3),
· · · ,H(EZµ,P1PN )}−H(EXµ ),
(A4)
where EZµ,P1Pm represents the bit flip error rate of parties P1
and Pm corresponding to the stabilizer Sm−1. The EXµ is the
BS1
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BS
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branch 1
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(b)
FIG. 5. (a) The entanglement based version of N-party PM-QCC
network. (b) The equivalent entanglement based version of N-
party PM-QCC network with virtual sources after Eve’s splitting.
In the Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), random phases are supposed to be
φ1 = φ2 = · · · = φ . Here, we omit the virtual qubits for simplic-
ity in subfigure (b). p1, p2L, · · · , pN : path modes after Eve’s split-
ting. DL1(DR1): the left (right) detector of the first measurement
branch. DL2(DR2): the left (right) detector of the second measure-
ment branch. DLN−1(DRN−1): the left (right) detector of the (N−1)-th
measurement branch. BS: Beam Splitter. Cpi : the control phase gate.
phase flip error corresponding to the stabilizer S0, H(x) =
−x log2(x)−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy function.
Appendix B: Security Analysis for PM-QCC
Without loss of generality, we consider an entanglement
based version that party Pm (1 ≤ m ≤ N) prepares entangle-
ment states between virtual qubits and his WCPs instead of
directly preparing WCPs. Thus, its security analysis applies to
the entanglement distillation argument [16, 53, 54]. As shown
in Fig. 5(a), there is a virtual qubit at each party
|+〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉).
7The party Pm prepares an entanglement state using a control
phase gate Cpi = |0〉〈0|Uo+ |1〉〈1|Upi between the virtual and
weak coherent pulse(WCP) that
|Ψ〉m = 1√
2
[|0〉|eiφ√µm〉+ |1〉|ei(φ+pi)√µm〉], (B1)
where U0(pi) will attach a phase of 0 (pi) to the WCP. Without
loss of generality, the phases of parties P1, P2, · · · , PN are sup-
posed to be φ1 = φ2 = · · · = φN = φ . The WCPs are sent to
untrusted third party, Eve, to perform interference measure-
ments with other parties. While, the virtual qubits are kept at
each party. As is stated in the main text, the WCP with random
phase φ of party Pm passing through the 50 : 50 beam splitter
BS1 is split into two WCPs with the same encoded phases.
|ei(φ+pikm)√µ〉 BS1−−→ |ei(φ+pikm)
√
µ/2〉⊗ |ei(φ+pikm)
√
µ/2〉,
(B2)
where φ +pikm is the encoded phase of party Pm. The proto-
col is the equivalent entanglement based protocol of Fig. 2(b).
Since the neighbor WCPs are of the same intensity, the only
difference is their phases. Thus, the WCPs in each branch can
be regarded as from one virtual WCP source |eiφ√µ〉, and the
protocol is straightforwardly equivalent to that in Fig. 5(b). In
the protocol of Fig. 5(b), the N-party sate evolves as
|+〉P1 |+〉P2 · · · |+〉PN
∞
∑
n1=0
e−µ/2
(eiφ
√µC†1)n1
n1!
∞
∑
n2=0
e−µ/2
(eiφ
√µC†2)n2
n2!
· · ·
∞
∑
nN−1=0
e−µ/2
(eiφ
√µC†N−1)nN−1
nN−1!
|vac〉
BS−→
∞
∑
n1,n2,··· ,nN−1=0
|+〉P1 |+〉P2 · · · |+〉PN
e−µ/2(µ)
n1
2
n1!
(
eiφ p†1+ e
iφ p†2L√
2
)n1
e−µ/2(µ)
n2
2
n2!
(
eiφ p†2R+ e
iφ p†3L√
2
)n2 · · ·
e−µ/2(µ)
nN−1
2
nN−1!
(
eiφ p†
(N−1)R+ e
iφ p†N√
2
)nN−1 |vac〉
Cpi−→ 1
2N/2
∞
∑
n1,n2,··· ,nN−1=0
e−(N−1)µ/2(µ)
n1+n2+···+nN−1
2
n1!n2! · · ·nN−1! [|0〉|0〉 · · · |0〉(
eiφ p†1+ e
iφ p†2L√
2
)n1(
eiφ p†2R+ e
iφ p†3L√
2
)n2 · · ·
(
eiφ p†
(N−1)R+ e
iφ p†N√
2
)nN−1 + · · ·
+ |1〉|1〉 · · · |1〉(−e
iφ p†1− eiφ p†2L√
2
)n1(
−eiφ p†2R− eiφ p†3L√
2
)n2 · · ·(
−eiφ p†
(N−1)R− eiφ p†N√
2
)nN−1 ]|vac〉
=
1
2(N−1)/2
∞
∑
n1,n2,··· ,nN−1=0
e−(N−1)µ/2(µ)
n1+n2+···+nN−1
2
n1!n2! · · ·nN−1!
· { ∑
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1∈{0,1}
1√
2
[|0i1i2 · · · iN−1〉+(−1)n1+n2+···+nN−1 |1i¯1 i¯2 · · · i¯N−1〉]
[
eiφ p†1+(−1)i1eiφ p†2L√
2
]n1 [
(−1)i1 eiφ p†2R+(−1)i2eiφ p†3L√
2
]n2 · · · [
(−1)iN−2eiφ p†
(N−1)R+(−1)iN−1eiφ p†N√
2
]nN−1}|vac〉,
=
1
2(N−1)/2
· ∑
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1∈{0,1}
{ 1√
2
[|0i1i2 · · · iN−1〉+ |1i¯1 i¯2 · · · i¯N−1〉]√peven|even〉µ
+
1√
2
[|0i1i2 · · · iN−1〉− |1i¯1 i¯2 · · · i¯N−1〉]√podd|odd〉µ},
(B3)
where C†i is the creation operator of the i-th virtual source,|vac〉 is the vacuum state, √peven and √podd are normalized
coefficients of pure state |even〉µ and |odd〉µ (see Eq. B11 to
Eq. B13) , p†1, p
†
2L, p
†
2R, · · · are the creation operator of the cor-
responding path mode after the BS1s. The BSs act as
BS =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
For example, considering the beams interfere at the second BS
shown in the first branch of Fig. 5(b). For input beams optical
modes p†1 and p
†
2L , the output modes L
†
1 and R
†
1 are
(
L†1
R†1
)
=
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
·
(
p†1
p†2L
)
, (B4)
8where L†1(R
†
1) means the output path mode to detector
D†L1 (D
†
R1
) for branch 1 in Fig. 5(b). Then, we have
p†1+(−1)i1 p†2L√
2
BS−→
{
L†1 if i1 = 0,
R†1 if i1 = 1.
(B5)
Thus, when i1 = 0 only detector DL1 clicks, while when
i1 = 1 only detector DR1 clicks. From Eq. B3, once there is a
success coincidence event that only one detector clicks in each
branch, a GHZ state of N parties is post-selected successfully
such that
|Ψ j,i1i2···iN−1〉=
1√
2
[|0i1i2 · · · iN−1〉
+(−1) j|1i¯1 i¯2 · · · i¯N−1〉],
(B6)
where, j = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ nN−1. One can obtain the phase
error correlation immediately
eXn1,n2,··· ,nN−1 =
{
1, for j ∈ odd,
0, for j ∈ even. (B7)
The phase error rate is determined by different photon number
components. Note that similar phase-error property is shown
in a improved analysis of PM-QKD [58]. When n1+n2+ · · ·+
nN−1 ∈ odd, eXn1,n2,··· ,nN−1 = 1 and when n1+n2+ · · ·+nN−1 ∈
even, eXn1,n2,··· ,nN−1 = 0. Using the correlation of Eq. B7 and
Eq. B3, the total phase error rate EXµ can be estimated as
EXµ =podd ·
Y oddµ
Qµ
, (B8)
where Y oddµ is the overall yield for odd number component,
and Qµ is the overall gain of signal pulses.
Following the entanglement distillation argument [53, 54],
to generate a sequence of almost perfectly secure key bits, P1,
P2, · · · , PN only need to share a sequence of almost perfect
GHZ states in term of monogamy of entanglement [55, 56].
From Eq. A4, the key generation rate of the PM-QCC network
is
RN−party =(
2
M
)N−1Qµ [1− f ·max{H(EZµ,P1P2),
H(EZµ,P1P3), · · · ,H(EZµ,P1PN )}−H(EXµ )],
(B9)
where ( 2M )
N−1 is the prefactor induced by phase post-
selection which can be optimized according to the experimen-
tal parameters [35, 36].
What is counter-intuitive in the security analysis of the
phase-matching protocol is that parties P1, P2, · · · , PN will
announce their random phases φ1, φ2, · · · , φN after Eve’s an-
nouncements of his measurement results. If the phases are not
announced by P1, P2, · · · , PN , the weak coherent pulses can be
regarded as the mixture of different photon number states in
which their phases are meaningless to the untrusted party, Eve.
While, after the announcement, their pulses can no longer be
regarded as the mixture of photon number states. Here, we
will show that the PM-QCC protocol is secure against the
phase announcements.
Firstly, the random phases are announced after Eve’s an-
nouncements. Thus, Eve’s announcement strategies cannot
depend on parties P1, P2, · · · , PN’s phase information.
Secondly, the security analysis is based on entanglement
distillation. After the phase announcement, one can still dis-
till perfect GHZ states which are decoupled from Eve accord-
ing to the monogamy of entanglement. Specifically, let us
consider the Beam splitting attack as an example in which
Eve manages to get the key information using the announced
phases.
In the Beam splitting attack, Eve can modulate transmis-
sion rates of the channels. For example, she using a beam
splitter with transmission rate η to simulate a lossy chan-
nel. The reflection signal beams are intercepted to Eve’s
registers, then the transmission beams are sent to interfer-
ometer through perfect channels. After the phase announce-
ments, Eve would extract some information from the inter-
cepted beams according to the phase announcements. From
Eq. B3, we know that the state arriving at the detectors can
be sort to n1 + n2 + · · ·+ nN−1 ∈ even or odd. Without loss
of generality, we consider only the components that would re-
sult in the detection events DL1DL2 · · ·DLN−1 in Eq. B3. The
correlated components are
1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)√peven|even〉µ
+
1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉− |11 · · ·1〉)√podd|odd〉µ ,
(B10)
where
|even〉µ(|odd〉µ) = 1√peven(odd) ∑n1+n2+···+nN−1∈even(odd)
e−(N−1)µ/2(µ)
n1+n2+···+nN−1
2
n1!n2! · · ·nN−1! {[
p†1+(−1)i1 p†2L√
2
]n1
⊗ [ (−1)
i1 p†2R+(−1)i2 p†3L√
2
]n2 ⊗·· ·
⊗ [
(−1)iN−2 p†
(N−1)R+(−1)iN−1 p†N√
2
]nN−1}|vac〉,
(B11)
peven = ∑
n1+n2+···+nN−1∈even
e−(N−1)µ(µ)n1+n2+···+nN−1
n1!n2! · · ·nN−1! ,
= e−(N−1)µ cosh[(N−1)µ]
(B12)
podd = 1− peven = e−(N−1)µ sinh[(N−1)µ] (B13)
with i1 = i2 = · · ·= iN−1 = 0 for Eq. B10. Here, we omit the
phase because Eve’s announcement strategy cannot dependent
on φ .
9When the phases are not announced, |even〉µ(|odd〉µ) is a
mixture of photon number states from Eve’s perspective after
the phase randomization. While, if the phases are announced,
|even〉µ(|odd〉µ) can no longer be regarded as a mixture of
photon number states. Considering the Beam splitting attack
using beam splitters with transmission rate η , the Eq. B10 can
be rewritten as
1√
2
[|00 · · ·0〉|
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉|
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉 · · · |
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉
+ |11 · · ·1〉|−
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉|−
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉 · · · |−
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉]
√
pηµeven|even〉ηµ
+
1√
2
[|00 · · ·0〉|
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉|
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉 · · · |
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉
− |11 · · ·1〉|−
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉|−
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉 · · · |−
√
(1−η)µ
2
〉]
√
pηµodd|odd〉ηµ
=
1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)[
√
p(1−η)µeven |even〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµeven|even〉ηµ +
√
p(1−η)µodd |odd〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµodd|odd〉ηµ ]
+
1√
2
(|00 · · ·0〉− |11 · · ·1〉)[
√
p(1−η)µodd |odd〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµeven|even〉ηµ +
√
p(1−η)µeven |even〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµodd|odd〉ηµ ],
(B14)
where |even〉ηµ (|odd〉ηµ ) interferes before phase announce-
ments, and cannot be used for eavesdropping.
√
pηµodd is the
normalization coefficient for pure state |odd〉ηµ , and similar
for other coefficients. While, |even〉(1−η)µ and |odd〉(1−η)µ
are intercepted by Eve, and can not be decoupled from private
qubits after phase announcements. Further, one can derive
that √
p(1−η)µeven |even〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµeven|even〉ηµ
+
√
p(1−η)µodd |odd〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµodd|odd〉ηµ
=
√
pµeven|even〉µ ,√
p(1−η)µodd |odd〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµeven|even〉ηµ
+
√
p(1−η)µeven |even〉(1−η)µ
√
pηµodd|odd〉ηµ
=
√
pµodd|odd〉µ .
(B15)
From Eq. B8, the phase error is estimated for coherent states
with intensity µ . Meanwhile, as shown in Eq. B15, the phase
error after the phase announcement can also be estimated by
Eq. B8. This means that the phase error induced by the phase
announcement has been estimated in Eq. B8, and can be cor-
rected during the entanglement distillation protocol according
to Eq. B9. Thus, the PM-QCC protocol is secure against the
phase announcements.
Furthermore, supposing that we can estimate the phase er-
ror accurately in Eq. B8, the PM-QCC protocol is still se-
cure even when the phase choices in the signal pulses are
announced before Eve’s measurement according to Eq. B15.
Thus, the phase compensation method just provides a practi-
cal and secure way to align phases for signal pulses, and the
PM-QCC protocol can be improved to a version without phase
post-selection in signal pulses (see Appendix E for detail).
Appendix C: Parameter Estimation for PM-QCC
Experimentally, the overall gain Qµ and marginal bit error
rates (QBER) EZµ,P1P2 ,E
Z
µ,P1P3 , · · · ,EZµ,P1PN can be directly es-
timated from the announced results. However, the phase error
EXµ can not be measured directly in experiments. We can adopt
the decoy-state method to estimate the phase error rate EXµ .
As shown in Fig. 5(b), supposing the phase matching con-
dition | jm+ jam− jm+1| mod M = 0 or M/2 is satisfied, the
click events in each branch are independent. In branch 1, the
gain Qµ,1 and the QBER E
Z,1
µ can be estimated as
Qµ,1 = P(DL1)+P(DR1),
EZ,1µ =
P(DL1)
P(DL1)+P(DR1)
,
(C1)
where P(DL1) means the probability that only detector DL1
clicks in branch 1, P(DR1) means the probability that only the
detector DR1 clicks in branch 1. Because of the independence
between the detection events of each branch when the phases
are matched, the the gain and QBERs for other branches can
be estimated as Qµ,t = Qµ,1 and E
Z,t
µ = E
Z,1
µ (2≤ t ≤ N−1).
Thus, the overall gain Qµ and the marginal QBER EZµ,P1Pm
between parties P1 and Pm are
Qµ = (Qµ,1)N−1 = poddY oddµ + pevenY
even
µ , (C2a)
EZµ,P1Pm =
bm−22 c
∑
k=0
C2k+1m−1 (E
Z,1
µ )
2k+1(1−EZ,1µ )m−2k−2, (C2b)
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whereC2k+1m−1 is the Binomial coefficient, bxc is the Floor func-
tion, Y oddµ (Y
even
µ )is the overall yield for odd (even) photon
number component. With the help of decoy-state method, we
can estimate poddY oddµ from Eq. C2a (see Appendix D for de-
tail). Then, the phase error rate EXµ can be estimated by Eq. B7
and Eq. B8.
Without loss of generality, one can derive the gain Qµ,1
and the QBER EZ,1µ for branch 1 [36] when the phase
matching condition | j1 + ja1 − j2| mod M = 0 or M/2 and
k1 = k2 = 0. Supposing the phase reference deviation φ0
is constrained to φ0 ∈ [− piM , piM ) with the help of the phase-
compensation method, the phase of parties P1 and P2 are
uniformly distributed on φ1 ∈ [ 2piM j1, 2piM ( j1 + 1)) and φ2 ∈
[ 2piM j1+φ0,
2pi
M ( j1+1)+φ0). To be simple and consistent with
Ref. [36], we take j1 = 0. Thus,
φ1 ∈ [0, 2piM ),
φ2 ∈ [φ0, 2piM +φ0).
(C3)
As shown in Fig. 5, the evolution of the encoded state of
parties P1 and P2 in branch 1 is
|eiφ1
√
ηµ/2〉p1 ⊗|eiφ2
√
ηµ/2〉p2L
BS−→ |
√
ηµ/2(eiφ1 + eiφ2)〉L1 ⊗|
√
ηµ/2(eiφ1 − eiφ2)〉R1 .
(C4)
where the transmission efficiency η consists of channel losses
and detection efficiencies. From Eq. C4, the pulses hitting
detectors DL1 and DR1 are independent. The probabilities of
click and non-click events for DL1 and DR1 can be directly
calculated that
P(L¯1) = (1− pd)exp(−ηµ cos2 φδ2 ),
P(L1) = 1−P(L¯1),
P(R¯1) = (1− pd)exp(−ηµ sin2 φδ2 ),
P(R1) = 1−P(R¯1).
(C5)
where P(L1)(P(L¯1)) is the click (non-click) probability of de-
tector DL1 , P(R1)(P(R¯1)) is the click (non-click) probability
of detector DR1 and φδ = φ2− φ1. The successful detection
probabilities for branch 1 are,
P(DL1) = P(L1)P(R¯1),
P(DR1) = P(L¯1)P(R1),
(C6)
respectively. Then, the gain Qµ,1 of branch1 is [36]
Qµ,1 = P(DL1)+P(DR1)
≈ 1− e−ηµ +2pde−ηµ ,
(C7)
where the approximation is obtained by ignoring sin2 φδ2 with
a small φδ and ignoring the higher order term pd(1− e−ηµ +
2pde−ηµ). For given φδ , the QBER is [36]
EZ,1µ (φδ ) =
P(DR1)
P(DL1)+P(DR1)
≈ e
−ηµ
Qµ,1
(pd+ηµ sin2
φδ
2
).
(C8)
where the approximation is obtained by taking eηµ sin
2 φδ
2 ≈
1+ηµ sin2 φδ2 with a small φδ and ignoring the higher order
term pd(pd +ηµ sin2
φδ
2 ). From Eq. C3 and φ0 ∈ [− piM , piM ),
the QBER EZ,1µ is of the form
EZ,1µ =
M
2pi
∫ pi
M
− piM
dφ0
∫ 3pi
M
− 3piM
dφδ f φ0(φδ )E
Z,1
µ (φδ )
=
(pd+ηµeδ )e−ηµ
Qµ,1
,
(C9)
where eδ = piM − M
2
pi2 sin
3 pi
M . Here, f
φ0(φδ ) is the probability
distribution of φδ for given φ0,
f φ0(φδ ) =

( M2pi )
2[φδ +( 2piM −φ0)],φδ ∈ [φ0− 2piM ,φ0),
( M2pi )
2[−φδ +( 2piM +φ0)],φδ ∈ [φ0,φ0+ 2piM ).
Appendix D: Decoy states analysis for PM-QCC
As stated in the main text, the signal pulses with intensity
µ are only used to estimate the gain Qµ and marginal quan-
tum bit error rates (QBER) EZµ,P1P2 , E
Z
µ,P1P3 , · · · , EZµ,P1PN . The
phase error EXµ are estimated from decoy pulses in intensity
set {ν ,ω,τ, · · · ,0}. The phase choices and intensities of the
users are announced after Eve’s announcement. Eve’s attacks
are independent of signal pulses and decoy pulses. Thus, the
decoy states can by used to estimate the phase error EXµ in the
signal pluses.
Considering the decoy pulses, the virtual sources in each
branch of the protocol of Fig. 5(b) are simultaneously random-
ized if the phase-matching conditions are satisfied: |φ1−φ2|=
0 or pi , |φ2−φ3|= 0 or pi , · · · , |φN−1−φN |= 0 or pi . For sim-
plicity, we take N = 3 and φ1 = φ2 = · · ·= φN = φ , the virtual
source under phase-matching condition is [58]
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ |eiφ√µ〉C1 |eiφ
√
µ〉C2〈eiφ
√
µ|C1〈eiφ
√
µ|C2
=
∞
∑
k
P2µ(k)|k〉〈k|,
(D1)
where P2µ(k) = e−2µ
(2µ)k
k! is the probability of generating k
photons in the virtual source, |k〉= [
1√
2
(C†1+C
†
2)]
k
√
k!
|vac〉 and k =
n1 + n2 is the total photon number of branch 1 and branch
2. Then the overall Qµ (Eq. C2a) and phase error rate EXµ
(Eq. B8) are turn to be
Qµ =
∞
∑
k
P2µ(k) ·Yk, (D2a)
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EXµ = ∑
k∈odd
P2µ(k)
Yk
Qµ
,
= 1− ∑
k∈even
P2µ(k)
Yk
Qµ
,
= 1− e−2µ · Y0
Qµ
− e−2µ (2µ)
2
2
· Y2
Qµ
−·· · ,
≤ 1− e−2µ · Y0
Qµ
− e−2µ (2µ)
2
2
· Y2
Qµ
,
≤ EX ,Uµ = 1− e−2µ · Y0Qµ − e
−2µ (2µ)2
2
· Y
L
2
Qµ
,
(D2b)
where Yk ∈ [0,1] is the yield when k photon are generated in
the virtual source and Y L2 is the lower bound of the yield when
2 photons are generated in the virtual source. EX ,Uµ is the up-
per bound of the phase error rate. The first inequality is ob-
tained by setting high-order terms including Y4, Y6, · · · to 0.
The second inequality is obtained by substituting Y2 with its
lower boundY L2 . From Eq. D2a, one can obtain a set of overall
gain with different decoy states which can be used to estima-
tion the Yield Yk. For 3-party PM-QCC protocol, four decoy
states with intensities {ν > ω > τ > 0} are adopted to esti-
mate the Y L2 using the Gaussian elimination method [44, 59].
e2νQν = Y0+2νY1+
(2ν)2
2
Y2+
(2ν)3
6
Y3+
(2ν)4
4!
Y4+ · · · ,
e2ωQω = Y0+2ωY1+
(2ω)2
2
Y2+
(2ω)3
6
Y3+
(2ω)4
4!
Y4+ · · · ,
e2τQτ = Y0+2τY1+
(2τ)2
2
Y2+
(2τ)3
6
Y3+
(2τ)4
4!
Y4+ · · · ,
Q0 = Y0,
(D3)
where Qν , Qω , Qτ and Q0 are overall gains for different decoy
states. From Eq. D3, one can cancel out the terms of Y0, Y1
and Y3 with the Gaussian elimination method and generate an
equation given by
G= G2 ·Y2+G4 ·Y4+G5 ·Y5+ · · · , (D4)
where
G=[2ω(2ν)3−2ν(2ω)3][2τ(e2ωQω −Q0)−2ω(e2τQτ −Q0)]
− [2τ(2ω)3−2ω(2τ)3][2ω(e2νQν −Q0)−2ν(e2ωQω −Q0)],
(D5a)
G2 =
[2ω(2ν)3−2ν(2ω)3][2τ(2ω)2−2ω(2τ)2]− [2τ(2ω)3−2ω(2τ)3][2ω(2ν)2−2ν(2ω)2]
2
, (D5b)
G4 =
[2ω(2ν)3−2ν(2ω)3][2τ(2ω)4−2ω(2τ)4]− [2τ(2ω)3−2ω(2τ)3][2ω(2ν)4−2ν(2ω)4]
4!
, (D5c)
...
Since ν > ω > τ > 0, one can see that G, G2 > 0 while G4,
G5 · · · < 0 by simple calculation. Thus, the lower bound Y L2
is obtained by setting Y4 = Y5 = · · · = 0 from Eq. D4 since
Yk ∈ [0,1] (see [60] for reference),
Y L2 =
2{[2ω(2ν)3−2ν(2ω)3][2τ(e2ωQω −Q0)−2ω(e2τQτ −Q0)]− [2τ(2ω)3−2ω(2τ)3][2ω(e2νQν −Q0)−2ν(e2ωQω −Q0)]}
[2ω(2ν)3−2ν(2ω)3][2τ(2ω)2−2ω(2τ)2]− [2τ(2ω)3−2ω(2τ)3][2ω(2ν)2−2ν(2ω)2] .
(D6)
The upper bound of the phase error rate is
EX ,Uµ = 1− e−2µ · Y0Qµ − e
−2µ (2µ)2
2
· Y
L
2
Qµ
. (D7)
Thus, the lower bound of the key generation rate for 3-party
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PM-QCC is
R3−party ≥ RL3−party
= (
2
M
)2Qµ [1− f ·max{H(EZµ,P1P2),
H(EZµ,P1P3)}−H(E
X ,U
µ )].
(D8)
The above decoy-state method can be directly generalized
to N ≥ 4 parties PM-QCC protocols. When it comes to N ≥ 4
parties, more linear constraints are needed to tightly estimate
the phase error rate EXµ shown in Eq. D10b. Specifically, based
on the structure of the N-party GHZ state, there are more than
two interference branches in the virtue protocol of Fig. 5(b).
If some of the branches have no photons, the corresponding
yield Yk will be rather small. Thus, in order to obtain a tight
upper bound of EXµ with Eq. D2b, one need more decoy states
to estimate the high-order terms of the yield Yk with the Gaus-
sian elimination method shown from Eq. D3 to D6. Here,
we shown the main steps to conduct the presented decoy-state
method as follows:
Step.1 For N-party PM-QCC protocol, the randomized virtual
source under phase-matching condition φ1 = φ2 = · · ·=
φN = φ is
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ |eiφ√µ〉C1 · · · |eiφ
√
µ〉CN−1〈eiφ
√
µ|C1 · · · 〈eiφ
√
µ|CN−1
=
∞
∑
k
P(N−1)µ(k)|k〉〈k|,
(D9)
where P(N−1)µ(k) = e−(N−1)µ
[(N−1)µ]k
k! is the probabil-
ity of generating k photons in the virtual source, |k〉 =
[ 1√
N−1 (C
†
1+C
†
2+···+C†N−1)]k√
k!
|vac〉 and k = n1 + n2 + · · · +
nN−1 is the total photon number of all the branches.
Step.2 Then the overall Qµ (Eq. C2a) and phase error rate EXµ
(Eq. B8) are turn to be
Qµ =
∞
∑
k
P(N−1)µ(k) ·Yk, (D10a)
EXµ = ∑
k∈odd
P(N−1)µ(k)
Yk
Qµ
,
= 1− ∑
k∈even
P(N−1)µ(k)
Yk
Qµ
,
= 1− e−(N−1)µ · Y0
Qµ
− e−(N−1)µ [(N−1)µ]
2
2
· Y2
Qµ
−·· · ,
≤ 1− e−(N−1)µ · Y0
Qµ
− e−(N−1)µ [(N−1)µ]
2
2
· Y2
Qµ
−·· ·
− e−(N−1)µ [(N−1)µ]
Ncut
Ncut!
· YNcut
Qµ
,
≤ EX ,Uµ = 1− e−(N−1)µ · Y0Qµ − e
−2µ [(N−1)µ]2
2
· Y
L
2
Qµ
−·· ·
− e−(N−1)µ [(N−1)µ]
Ncut
Ncut!
· Y
L
Ncut
Qµ
,
(D10b)
where Ncut is the cut number to bound the phase error
rate, and Ncut = N−1 (N) if N is odd (even)
Step.3 The Gaussian elimination method shown in Eq. D3 to
D6 is adopt to estimate the lower bounds Y L2 , · · · ,Y LNcut .
To estimate the high-order terms Y Lk , one only need to
add extra linear constraints to Eq. D3 by adding extra
decoy states, say {ν ,ω,τ, · · · ,0}, to construct Eq. D4.
Then, one can directly obtain the high-order terms Y Lk
from Eq. D4.
Step.4 With the lower bounds Y L2 , · · · ,Y LNcut , one can obtain the
upper bound of the phase error rate EX ,Uµ according to
Eq. D10b.
Definitely, from the view of linear program, to well bound
the yield YNcut , Ncut + 1 linear constraints is needed using the
Gaussian elimination method. Thus, the number of decoy
sates increases linearly with the communication parties N in
the presented decoy-state method. On the other hand, if one
adopts the decoy-state estimation using the data when dif-
ferent parties send out different intensities, one can generate
more decoy-state constraints of Eq. D3. In this case, when
the number of parties N gets larger, the number of constraints
also increases. This has already been studied in quantum key
distribution, for example, see [42, 44]. From this point of
view, when N gets larger, one may not need more decoy states
for each party. We remark that, similar problems have been
solved in a different scenario in [61] where few decoy-state
settings are enough to generate a good estimation of the yield
that each of the N parties send out one photon. Thus, with
more advanced decoy-state method, it is possible to reduce
the required decoy-state number for each party.
Appendix E: PM-QCC* without phase post-selection in the
signal pulses
As stated in Appendix B, supposing that we can estimate
the phase error accurately, the PM-QCC protocol is still se-
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cure even when the phase choices in the signal pulses are an-
nounced before Eve’s measurement. Without loss of general-
ity, the phase choices for signal pulses of party Pi can be set
to φi = 0. The PM-QCC* without phase post-selection in the
signal pulses run as follows:
Step.1 Preparation: The pulses are divided to be signal
mode with intensity µ and decoy mode with inten-
sities {ν ,ω,τ, · · · ,0}. In the signal mode, Party P1
randomly generates one bit k1 ∈ {0,1} and a coher-
ent pulse |√µ1〉. Then, he encodes the random bit to
the coherent pulse and get a encoded coherent pulses
|eipik1√µ1〉. Similarly, parties P2, · · · , PN get encoded
coherent pulses |eipik2√µ2〉, · · · , |eipikN√µN〉, respec-
tively. In the decoy mode, party P1 randomly gener-
ates one bit k1 ∈ {0,1} and a coherent pulse with ran-
dom phase φ1 ∈ [0,2pi). Then, he encodes the random
bit to the coherent pulse and get a phase randomized
coherent pulses |ei(φ1+pik1)√µ1〉. Similarly, parties P2,
· · · , PN prepare their phase randomized coherent pulses
|ei(φ2+pik2)√µ2〉, · · · , |ei(φN+pikN)√µN〉, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 1, the experimental setup is asymmet-
ric for parties P1, PN and P2, · · · , PN−1. Thus, the in-
tensities of the weak coherent pulses for parties P1, PN
are set to be µ1,µN ∈ { µ2 > ν2 > ω2 > τ2 > · · · > 0},
while the intensities for parties P2, · · · , PN−1 are set to
be µt ∈ {µ > ν > ω > τ > · · ·> 0} (2≤ t ≤ N−1) for
signal and decoy pulses. The pulses corresponding with
intensity µ are signal pulses and the pulses correspond-
ing with intensities {ν ,ω,τ, · · · ,0} are used as decoy
pulses.
Step.2 Measurement: Same as PM-QCC.
Step.3 Announcement: Same as PM-QCC.
Step.4 Sifting: Same as PM-QCC.
Step.5 Parameter estimation and Key distillation: The
above steps are repeated enough times to distill the
raw key bits. From the data set generated by the sig-
nal pulses, the users can directly estimate the gain Q∗µ
and marginal quantum bit error rates (QBER) EZ∗µ,P1P2 ,
EZ∗µ,P1P3 , · · · , EZ∗µ,P1PN from the measurement results.
From the data set generated by the decoy pulses, the
users can estimate the phase error EX∗µ according to
decoy-state methods. Finally, they distill private key
bits by performing error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation on the raw key.
According to Appendix D, the decoy states are simultane-
ously randomized under phase-matching condition, and the
above mentioned decoy-state method can be directly used
to estimate the phase error EXµ in signal mode for the PM-
QCC protocol. However, in the PM-QCC* protocol the signal
pulses from the parties can no longer be regarded as photon
number states since the phase randomization for signal pulses
has been cancelled out. Thus, the above decoy states dis-
cussion becomes unsuitable for the PM-QCC* protocol, and
more delicate decoy-state method is required to evaluate the
phase error rate in the signals [40, 42, 43]. For example, as
in [42], the estimation of phase error rate is converted to the
estimation of the yields for the photon number state, which
can be estimated using phase randomized decoy states. Thus,
the phase randomized decoy states with different intensities
can in principle be used to constraint the phase error rate EXµ
tightly and we leave if for further studies. The gain Q∗µ,1 of
branch1 is
Q∗µ,1 = Qµ,1, (E1)
the QBER is
EZ∗,1µ =
P(DR1)
P(DL1)+P(DR1)
=
(1− pd)(e−ηµ(1−eδ )) · (1− (1− pd)(e−ηµeδ ))
Q∗µ,1
,
(E2)
where eδ is the phase misaligned error for signal mode during
the phase reference. From the Eq. C2a, Eq. C2b and Eq. B8,
the overall gain, Marginal QBERs and phase error are
Q∗µ = Qµ , (E3a)
EZ∗µ,P1Pm =
bm−22 c
∑
k=0
C2k+1m−1 (E
Z∗,1
µ )
2k+1(1−EZ∗,1µ )m−2k−2, (E3b)
EX∗µ = E
X
µ . (E3c)
According to a former discussion on PM-QKD [40], one can
simply suppose that a sufficient parameter estimation can be
made by a complete characterization of Eve’s measurement
operators. As a result, the estimated phase error rate EX∗µ is
equal to the detected fraction of the odd photon number com-
ponent in the infinite-key regime. Then, the key generation
rate for PM-QCC protocol without phase-matching condition
in signal modes is
R∗N−party =Q
∗
µ [1− f ·max{H(EZ∗µ,P1P2),
H(EZ∗µ,P1P3), · · · ,H(EZ∗µ,P1PN )}−H(EX∗µ )].
(E4)
Appendix F: Comparison with MDI-QCC
We compare the performance of PM-QCC with that of
MDI-QCC in Ref. [17] when N = 3. The key rate of MDI-
QCC in simulation is
RMDI−QCC = QZ111[1−H(eBX111)]−H(EZ∗µνω) fQZµνω , (F1)
where EZ∗µνω =max{H(EZABµνω),H(EZACµνω)}, QZµνω(EZ∗µνω) is the
gain (QBER) of the Z basis, QZ111 is the gain of single photon
component, eBX111 is the single photon QBER of the X basis,
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f is the error correction efficiency and H(x) = −x log2(x)−
(1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function.
From Eq. C2a, one can obtain that Qµ ∝ ηN−1, where
η = e−αL/10 is the transmission rate of the optical channel,
α is the corresponding loss rate, L is the distance from each
party to the measurement station. Thus, the key generate
rate RPM−QCC ∝ ηN−1. Nevertheless, in measurement de-
vice independent quantum cryptographic conferencing (MDI-
QCC) [17], one can calculate that QZ111 ∝ η3 when dark-count
rate pd = 0. Intuitively, N photons are coincidentally de-
tected by N different detectors for N-party MDI-QCC net-
works based on the GHZ state analyzer [30] with coincidence
probability Pco ∝ ηN . Then, we obtain that RMDI−QCC ∝ ηN
according to Eq. F1. Therefore, the presented PM-QCC can
improve the key generation rate from O(ηN) to O(ηN−1).
BS BS
BS1
FCFC
BS
FC
BS1
Eve
BS1
FC FC
Failed
(a)
BS
BS1
 
 
 Eve
(b)
BSBS
Eve
(c)
FIG. 6. (a) The 3-party PM-QCC network and the 2-party PM-
QKD protocol reduced from the 5-party PM-QCC network. In some
rounds of 5-party PM-QCC only sets {P1,P2,P5} and {P4,P5} are
successfully interfered, while, the interference of {P3,P4} failed. (b)
The entanglement based PM-QKD protocol for parties P4 and P5. (c)
The equivalent entanglement based PM-QKD protocol for P4 and P5
with virtual source. BS: Beam Splitter. FC: Fiber Channel. Cpi : the
control phase gate.
Appendix G: Reduce to Small-scale PM-QCC Networks
Practically, the N-party PM-QCC network might not work
perfectly, i.e. there might not be perfect N-party interferences
of the weak coherent states. We consider the case that N′-
party inferences (N′ parties are near-neighbor connected, and
2≤ N′ ≤ N) are realized in some rounds of N-party PM-QCC
network. For example, as shown in Fig. 6(a), only the inter-
ferences of sets {P1,P2,P3} and {P4,P5} are realized, while,
the interference of {P3,P4} failed in the 5-party PM-QCC net-
work. According to Step.1 of the PM-QCC network, the co-
herent pulses sent by parties at the broken point are |√µ〉 in-
stead of |√µ/2〉 (here,we omit the phase information). Con-
sidering asymmetric mean photon numbers for two arms of an
interference branch, we show that reduced small-scale PM-
QCC networks and PM-QKD protocol can also be realized
securely.
TABLE II. The performance for the reduced 3-party PM-QCC net-
work shown in Fig. 6(a). The key generation rate R, mean pho-
ton number µ and phase slice number M are optimized with pd =
7.2× 10−8, ηd = 65%, f = 1.16 and α = 0.2 dB/km at different
transmission distance L.
Rreduced 3-party (bits per pulse) L (Km) µ M
1.7060×10−7 50 0.1059 13
1.6152×10−9 100 0.1032 13
Without loss of generality, we consider the interference of
parties P4 and P5 as shown in Fig. 6(b). The virtual entangle-
ment based PM-QKD protocol with a virtual weak coherent
state source |eiφ√µV〉 (µV = µa + µb) is shown in Fig. 6(c).
For the above small-scale PM-QCC network and PM-QKD
protocol, the average number of photons for parties at the
boundary are not equal. The weak coherent pulses after en-
coding of parties P4 and P5 are |eiφa√µa〉 and |eiφb√µb〉, re-
spectively, with µa = µ and µb = µ2 . As shown in Fig. 6(b),
the weak coherent states arriving for interference are equal,
i.e. |eiφa√ηaµa〉 and |eiφb√ηbµb〉 with ηaµa = ηbµb = ηµ2 .
According to Eq. C4 ∼ C9, the gain and QBER of this branch
with asymmetric average number of photons are equal to the
original branch.
Q
′
µV,1 = Qµ,1
E
′Z,1
µV,1 = E
Z,1
µ .
(G1)
Meanwhile, higher amounts of weak coherent pulses are lost
during the transmission. This will result in a lower key gen-
eration rate for small-scale PM-QCC network or PM-QKD
protocol, which is embodied in the estimation of EXµ from
Eq. B8. Specifically, we present the performance of the re-
duced 3-party PM-QCC network from 5-party PM-QCC net-
work shown in Fig. 6(a) in Table. II. In practice, the coher-
ent pulses and phase slices M might be pre-optimized for big-
ger PM-QCC network, and the key generation rate for the re-
duced 3-party PM-QCC network might decrease to a lower
level compared with the results in Table. II. However, ac-
cording to Eq. G1, the gain of this asymmetric branch still
scales with Q
′
µV,1 ∝ η . Thus, a key generation rate scales
with Rreduced PM−QCC ∝ ηN
′−1 can also be obtained according
to Eq. B9 for the N′ parties PM-QCC network.
Therefore, the N-party PM-QCC network can be reduced to
small-scale PM-QCC networks and PM-QKD protocols when
there are only parts of the N parties are interfered altogether.
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